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An exploration of the several difficulties faced in the implementation of California’s Proposition
215, which attempted to make marijuana legal in the state. As Proposition 215 went directly against federal
law, the focus is on the federal-state interaction that followed. The paper argues that the principles of
federalism could be applied to further interactions in order to improve state law, instead of attempting to
suppress medical marijuana or leaving California’s flawed system to its own ends.

1.	
  	
  Introduction:	
  The	
  Problems	
  of	
  Medical	
  Marijuana	
  in	
  California	
  
In 1996, Proposition 215, now known as the Compassionate Use Act (CUA), passed by
popular initiative in California. The new law stated plainly that:
…seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes where that
medical use is deemed appropriate and has been recommended by a physician who has determined that the
person's health would benefit from the use of marijuana…”1

In one swift stroke, the use of marijuana for virtually any medical purposes became legal
in the state of California. Beyond this, the law mostly encouraged the state government not to
interfere with these new standards, and exempt users and their caregivers from state prosecution.
While this seems simple enough in principle, Proposition 215 would spend the next fifteen years
facing problems with implementation, forcing the state government to create one major revision
and several more minor ones, spawning scores of court cases and facing constant interference
from the federal government. At the heart of these problems were the facts that Proposition 215
was vaguely worded and did not come packaged with any clear method for creating statewide
implementation, faced a significant amount of backlash from those who felt morally opposed to
it, and went directly against federal law, leading to a complex and problematic interaction
between the state and federal government.
Under federal law, marijuana in any form is completely illegal for use or possession, even
if intended for medical purposes. In the Controlled Substances Act (aka CSA, originally passed
as the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970), marijuana and its
derivatives are placed under Schedule I, meaning that it’s illegal for all forms of use, including
medical purposes.2

1
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category includes powerful opiates such as heroin and morphine, as well as hallucinogens such
as LSD and peyote. Marijuana is quantifiably the least dangerous drug in Schedule I,3 as well as
potentially the most medically useful: the drug has both analgesic and anti-inflammatory powers,
as well as anti-emetic and appetite-stimulating effects.4
Passing Proposition 215 forced California’s legislature to flagrantly ignore the CSA,
legalizing something under state law that was made illegal by the federal government. Yet
despite several cases of medical marijuana usage making their way into higher level courts,
including a few high profile Supreme Court cases such as US v. Oakland Cannabis Buyer’s
Cooperative and Raich v. Gonzales, no decision has fully reconciled federal and state law.
Similarly, any effort by Congress to acknowledge the situation beyond public condemnation and
investigative hearings has fallen by the wayside. As of 2011, the federal response has been
limited to numerous raids on California users and dispensaries executed by the DEA. Even this
was been suspended as of a 2009 missive from attorney general Eric Holder instructing the DEA
to focus their attention away from medical marijuana users/dispensaries.5
Beyond conflicting with federal legislation, burgeoning medical marijuana policy in
California also had several intrinsic flaws. The Compassionate Use Act began life as
extraordinarily broad, vague legislation that was so substantially problematic for local law
enforcement that, seven years later, the State Senate passed an additional set of laws known as
the Medical Marijuana Program act (MMP), stipulating additional rules that created
identification cards for medically exempt users and legalized sale and transport of medical
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marijuana throughout the state.6 Even after this, each county was still given a wide berth to
interpret the law as they chose, leading to wildly inconsistent implementation throughout the
state.7
Most importantly, the Compassionate Use Act ultimately did not perform the way voters
intended. Popular support for medical marijuana has consistently been strong in California, but
support for outright legalization has never solidified. Proposition 19, another initiative that
would have legalized all forms of marijuana use (including recreational use), failed by an eight
percent margin last year.8 The people have thus created a clear distinction between approval for
medical versus non-medical use, and the implementation of the CUA should have followed a
similar path.
Yet numerous accounts have claimed that obtaining the requisite identification card for
medical use is a less than rigorous process. An article in the New Yorker describes one person’s
process of obtaining the card:
[The recommender] began a fifteen-minute interview, asking me about my reasons for wanting the
drug. “How long have you been under the care of a psychiatrist?” he asked me, writing down the answer on
a notepad. I provided him with a bill from my psychiatrist in New York, along with proof that I was
currently living in California. He then quizzed me about my brief and unsatisfactory experiences with
prescription medications for anxiety and depression, and my history of illegal drug use. Deciding that I was
a suitable candidate for a medical marijuana recommendation, Dr. Dean took my money and provided me
with a quick tutorial on strains of pot—indica offered a “body high,” whereas sativa was “more heady and
abstract”—along with a signed letter certifying that I was a patient under his care.9

An article in the Washington Post described a similar experience:
"Medical marijuana, right here, right now," chants a barker on the Venice Beach Boardwalk,
outside the doorway of the Medical Kush Beach Club. "Get legal, right now."
It really is that easy, the barker explains. Before being allowed to enter the upstairs dispensary and
"smoking lounge," new customers are directed first to the physician's waiting room, presided over by two
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young women in low-cut tops. After proving state residence and minimum age (21), customers see a doctor
in a white lab coat who for $150 produces a "physician's recommendation”.10

Most damningly, a blogger in Mother Jones described a “race” between him and his
spouse to obtain medical marijuana. While his wife had chronic arthritis, he was relatively free
of maladies. While the author went to an advertised clinic, his wife asked her general
practitioner for assistance. The author received his recommendation in “less than 90 seconds,”11
while his wife was unsuccessful.
The ballots in California speak for themselves; intrastate medical marijuana was
supposed to be tightly controlled, distributed only to those with a serious illness who could
benefit from the treatment. The drug should have been managed like any other dangerous
pharmaceutical (e.g. Vicodin, Percoset, Adderall) with a distinct potential for abuse. Tight
controls and prescription requirements could have eliminated this issue, if not necessarily some
of the confusion surrounding enforcement of the new laws. Instead, Proposition 215 and its
associated responses created a gray market, a system where people with legitimate medical
concerns were often stymied in their attempts to get medicine while those who were willing to
resort to shadier tactics could easily obtain a “pot card” even if they had no medical need for one.
This paper proposes that the principles of federalism could be the key to solving
California’s medical marijuana problems – as a lack of federalism is one of the reasons they
began. Federalism holds that the states should have a measure of independence from the federal
government, whose powers should be limited to more national affairs. Incapable of encroaching
on state powers to the extent of forcing California to repeal the law, the federal government did
everything short of that, threatening physicians with the removal of their licenses, arresting
numerous medical marijuana users and publicly decrying the legislation even as twelve other
10
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states adopted similar provisions. This interference effectively chilled the actions of legitimate
physicians even more than they might have been otherwise, leaving less qualified “caregivers” to
recommend the drug in their place. The CUA’s evolution from vague mandate to haphazard
identification system came as a result of numerous complications both on a local and state level,
but much of the existence of the gray market can be blamed upon the federal response to the law.
Essentially, the problems with medical marijuana in California arose as an intersection of
poorly-written legislation and botched federal intervention. That said, the problems in
California’s system were hardly unsolvable, and had the federal government taken a role in
attempting to iron out those issues instead of steadfastly denying medical marijuana’s existence,
perhaps the gray market could have been avoided. In fact, this paper argues that such a change is
still possible. At this point, instead of attempting to block the medical marijuana movement or
simply surrendering to the problematic system that is in place, the federal government could
attempt to guide it – to help create the tightly regimented distribution system that the law called
for through the use of established agencies such as the FDA, without mandating throughout the
nation that medical marijuana be treated unequivocally as either legal or illegal.
However, such a change is extraordinarily unlikely to come from either the legislative or
executive branches; the past forty years of the war on drugs have proven the issue to be
politically intractable. However, there is still one way that the federal government could change
its stance towards medical marijuana, one tied into an important shift in recent judicial thought.
As both medical necessity and due process-based arguments failed to move the courts, the most
recent cases about medical marijuana have centered around a renewed emphasis on states’ rights
under the Tenth Amendment. While Raich v. Gonzales (2005) seemed to put an end to this
argument by broadening the Commerce Clause, a further case, Santa Cruz v. Holder, was being
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pursued before Holder announced the shift in DEA policy. Santa Cruz might have forced
Congress’s hand in such a significant way as to reorient the entire federal policy towards medical
marijuana. This paper explores the possibilities for such a shift by examining recent changes in
the Court’s use of constitutional federalism and its treatment of the Commerce Clause, in
conjunction with a thorough look at the history of medical marijuana in the US, particularly in
California.

2.	
  A	
  Brief	
  History	
  of	
  Marijuana	
  Prohibition	
  
Just over a century ago, marijuana was actually an ingredient in a number of
pharmaceutical tonics and cures. The plant was formerly included in the United States
Pharmacopoeia until the creation of numerous statutes that banned or taxed the substance.12 Of
course, this was roughly cotemporaneous with the era in which cocaine was an active ingredient
in Coca-Cola, so this information should be taken with a grain of salt. Regardless, it’s important
to note that marijuana was actually criminalized far later than most other drugs; the first major
action against it came with the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937.
Early Prohibition
Prior to the Tax Act, during the 1920s, “...twenty-one states had also restricted the sale of
marijuana as part of their general narcotics articles, one state had prohibited its use for any
purpose, and four states had outlawed its cultivation.”13 Much of this flurry of state legislation
was a direct result of the Harrison Narcotic Tax Act of 1914 and the Uniform State Narcotic
Drugs Act of 1934, when Congress provided strong encouragement for the states to ban harder
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drugs such as cocaine and opium.14 After state legislatures banned the hard drugs (and alcohol,
under Prohibition) they began to worry about which drugs would be used as “substitutes”:
The early laws against the cannabis drugs were passed with little public attention. Concern about
marijuana was related primarily to the fear that marijuana use would spread, even among whites, as a
substitute for the opiates and alcohol made more difficult to obtain by federal legislation.15

Racism was also a major factor in many of the early state bans; one Montana newspaper
wrote after its own state legislature passed a regulatory measure:
Marihuana is Mexican opium, a plant used by Mexicans and cultivated for sale by Indians. "When
some beet field peon takes a few rares of this stuff," explained Dr. Fred Fulsher of Mineral County, "He
thinks he has just been elected president of Mexico so he starts out to execute all his political enemies.”16

Even in these early state bans, the roots of national marijuana prohibition are apparent:
ignorance as to the drug’s actual effects, racism against its perceived users, and the continual
implication of marijuana in the larger war on hard drugs.
Subsequently, Congress passed the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, which essentially
extended the Harrison legislation, placing restrictive taxes and fines upon the sale and transfer of
any of the elements of the marijuana plant.17 Nothing about marijuana was made specifically
illegal on the federal scale; the goal was simply to control its usage by making it prohibitively
expensive. Marijuana possession, sale and use would not become a federal crime until the
passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.
The Controlled Substances Act
In 1970, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act,
one assumes at both President Richard Nixon’s urging and in response to backlash over the drug
craze of the 1960s. The Act essentially created a list of acceptable uses for known drugs, making
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their consumption federal crimes if used inappropriately (e.g. a substance that was limited to
medical use being used recreationally). While some medical experts were invited to testify about
marijuana, the bill was crafted by attorneys, who created the scheduling system and assigned
substances to each tier. Schedule I, the tier that marijuana was placed in, provides that:
(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.
(B) The drug or other substance has no currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States.
(C) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or
other substance under medical supervision.18

Schedules II-V indicate lower potentials for abuse, greater medical potential, and higher
levels of accepted safety. The Schedule list hasn’t changed significantly over the ensuing years.
The DEA has remained in charge of overseeing and enforcing the CSA. Several attempts were
made to lower marijuana’s place on the list of Schedules; one of the most notable of these
occurred in 1988, at an internal hearing on medical marijuana within the DEA. The presiding
administrative judge, Francis L. Young, actually determined the drug should be rescheduled:
Judge Young recommended that [marijuana] be placed on Schedule II, so that it could be
prescribed by physicians under controlled circumstances, noting that "the evidence in this record clearly
shows that marijuana has been accepted as capable of relieving the distress of great numbers of very ill
people, and doing so with safety under medical supervision. It would be unreasonable, arbitrary and
capricious for DEA to continue to stand between those sufferers and the benefits of this substance in light
of the evidence in this record.”19

Young’s recommendation would have completely eliminated the conflict between
medical marijuana supporters and federal law, while retaining the illegal nature of recreational
use. However, the administrator of the DEA declined Young’s recommendation, and no changes
to the scheduling were made.

18
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Presidential Policies Through The Years
The beginning of major presidential opposition to marijuana usage of all forms can be
found in the presidency of Richard M. Nixon. Among the numerous taped conversations
recorded during Nixon’s presidency are several that find him excoriating marijuana as the drug
of choice for hippies and Jews.20 Nixon created the National Commission on Marijuana and
Drug Abuse in 1970,21 whose very name indicated the causal link it intended to find. However,
two years later, the Commission returned with a report that “while marijuana was not entirely
safe, its dangers had been exaggerated.”22 The drug was not physically addicting, and reports of
so-called “amotivational syndrome” and marijuana use acting as a “gateway” drug were not
entirely accurate. Nixon never acted on the report, and in 1974 a Senate Judiciary Committee
assembled to attack its findings.23
Gerald Ford essentially continued Nixon’s policies. Jimmy Carter initially attempted to
undo some of the harsher provisions against marijuana use, but his initiatives were roundly
rejected by Congress, and negative public reaction caused him to quickly reverse course.24
Ronald Reagan brought the war on drugs to impressive new heights, and allegedly assembled
studies to deliberately seek out “something wrong with marijuana.”25 George H.W. Bush
continued his predecessor’s stringent policies.
The Clinton presidency provided an interesting turning point; Bill Clinton was the first
president to have admitted to using marijuana, despite his caveat that he “didn’t inhale.” The
worry of looking “soft on drugs” actually pushed Clinton toward much greater efforts to pursue
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an aggressive anti-drug agenda,26 which extended to his attitude about medical marijuana. In the
wake of Proposition 215 he announced that federal law was still firmly in place and that
California’s provisions were still illegal.27 Only after Clinton was nearing the end of his
presidency did he suggest in an interview that he supported decriminalizing marijuana.28 George
W. Bush also admitted to various forms of drug use in his earlier years, but his administration
stepped up the number of raids on medical marijuana facilities.29 The DEA shut down
somewhere between 30 and 40 dispensaries over the course of his presidency.30
Barack Obama continued the recent pattern of presidents who admitted to using
marijuana in their youth, but his public stance differed in a crucial way: he actually supported
medical marijuana. In his 2007 campaign he publicly mentioned that he thought medical
marijuana could be viewed as no different from morphine in palliative effects.31 When in office,
he made good on those views and encouraged the executive branch to redirect their efforts away
from medical users and towards preventing youth from abusing substances. Obama’s directive
led to a 2009 memo from Deputy Attorney General David Ogden that officially directed the
Department of Justice’s resources away from medical marijuana users, focusing instead on
illegal trafficking:
As a general matter, pursuit of these priorities should not focus federal resources in your States
on individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing
for the medical use of marijuana. For example, prosecution of individuals with cancer or other serious
illnesses who use marijuana as part of a recommended treatment regimen consistent with applicable state
law, or those caregivers in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state law who provide such
individuals with marijuana, is unlikely to be an efficient use of limited federal resources.32
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The Ogden memo was seen as a turning point for many medical marijuana users in
California, even causing the ACLU to suspend a major lawsuit, Santa Cruz v. Holder, the
outcome of which could have drastically changed the situation in California.33 Yet the letter did
not change the permanent stance of the federal government towards state law; it merely created a
sort of détente between federal and state forces while redirecting resources towards greater
efficiency in pursuing illegal trafficking. Removing the focus from medical marijuana was
hardly the same as endorsing the state programs, and the impermanence of this solution means
that it could theoretically change as soon as Obama leaves office, should the next president be
unfavorable towards medical marijuana.
Actual Medical Effects of Marijuana
With all of the overheated claims about marijuana usage from both detractors and
supporters, it is easy to forget some of the reasons medical marijuana was considered useful to
begin with. In 1997 the NIH published a study detailing some potential medical benefits to use
of the drug, including:
-Relief from nausea
-Reduction of intraocular pressure
-Reduction of muscle spasms
34
-Relief from chronic pain.

The potential use for many of these capabilities should be readily apparent. Marijuana’s
appetite-stimulating and anti-emetic properties are extraordinarily useful for chemotherapy
patients. The reduction of intraocular pressure can help relieve glaucoma symptoms, and the
reduction of muscle spasms indicates usefulness in treating multiple sclerosis patients. However,
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it is worth noting that most patients in California claim the last (and most general) effect, relief
of chronic pain, as their reason for seeking treatment.35
Also notable in the ongoing struggle to regulate medical marijuana is a brief period where
the government experimented with its own “Compassionate Use” program, dispensing medical
marijuana cigarettes to patients with glaucoma.36 The program was initially quite small, but once
it was publicized demand for participation greatly increased. The government subsequently shut
down the program to all new users and gradually cut off the production of the cigarettes.
Regardless, the federal program was still a source of contention in later court cases that claimed
equal protection conflicts, and thus became a fairly essential part of the federal government’s
history with regard to medical marijuana.
Marijuana vs. Marinol
Further complicating the issue was the creation of synthesized THC; dronabinol,
marketed by pharmaceutical companies as Marinol. Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol is supposedly
the main active ingredient in marijuana, and Marinol was thus supposed to have the same
analgesic properties in an easily-controlled, orally ingested pill, completely eliminating the need
for medical marijuana. Unfortunately, the realities of Marinol’s performance did not live up to
its promise.
Key among issues was the standardized dosage present in Marinol. THC has a wide
variety of effects among users, and differing amounts can achieve radically different results;
many dronabinol users complained of feeling incapacitated, when a smaller amount of marijuana
usage would have had less impairing effects. Furthermore, Marinol’s slow onset time (roughly
2-3 hours) made it much more difficult to use for immediate discomfort than inhalation of
35
36
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marijuana, the effects of which are present for most users in under fifteen minutes. More
seriously, dronabinol’s pill format meant that the majority of the drug was filtered out by the
liver before actually working its way into the bloodstream, and in doing so anywhere from 60-80
percent of the active dose was removed before taking effect.37 Finally, THC is just one chemical
in marijuana, and may actually be less effective in isolation than it is when combined with the
whole,38 particularly for users who are taking marijuana for anti-inflammatory effects.39
Regardless, Marinol was taken by the federal government as the acceptable medical
substitute for marijuana. While marijuana remained in Schedule I, Marinol was rescheduled to
Schedule III, denoting:
A) The drug or other substance has a potential for abuse less
than the drugs or other substances in schedules I and II.
B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States.
C) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to moderate
or low physical dependence or high psychological dependence.40

Marijuana and Marinol contain the same active substance, yet there is a world of
difference between their descriptions in the CSA. While marijuana was still considered a
dangerous, easily abused drug, Marinol was deemed safe for medical treatment and non-habitforming.
Marijuana’s Role in the Drug War
One key reason for the hostility of the federal government towards marijuana is its place
in the larger War on Drugs. Marijuana is perhaps the most commonly used illegal substance in
the United States, far more so than cocaine or heroin. When justifying increased spending on
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anti-drug programs, the DEA and Congress have a tendency to point to overall figures of illegal
drug users currently in the United States instead of breaking the statistics down by category.
Without marijuana users, these figures would be far lower.41 Thus, many commentators have
suggested that much of the opposition from marijuana stems from the government’s need to
maintain the war on drugs, essentially using the statistical inflation from marijuana users to fuel
opposition to the more dangerous substances.

3.	
  Proposition	
  215	
  and	
  Reactions	
  
Proposition 215 was hardly the first medical marijuana bill proposed in
California; two previous bills had actually been drafted by the state legislature before Governor
Pete Wilson vetoed them and ended the process.42 The passing of Proposition 215 and the
immediate and long-term difficulties of its implementation continued to show a state government
that was at odds with itself as well as the people. In many ways this can be accounted for by the
political diversity of the state of California – the largest of the United States, separated into 58
different and often largely autonomous counties.43
This diversity made the frustratingly imprecise nature of the Compassionate Use Act’s
verbiage subject to a huge range of interpretations. While those who crafted 215 ostensibly
created “at least 20 drafts” that were submitted to the state legislative counsel’s office for
revision,44 the ultimate law was still problematically vague, leading to massive problems with
implementation that were only compounded by difficulties created by the DEA. This section
41
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examines the creation of the initiative, and its subsequent impact on the state of California over
the next fifteen years.
The Creation and Passing of Proposition 215
In the wake of the two vetoes on state legislature medical marijuana bills, Dennis Peron,
a gay rights activist and longtime supporter of medicinal marijuana use, assembled a number of
other marijuana activists and decided to craft an initiative for a statewide medicinal use law:
They wanted something similar to the law just passed by the state legislature, which provided a
defense in court for people who had a doctor’s recommendation for a small list of diseases against
marijuana possession charges, along with a preamble to explain the purposes and intention of the new law
and a bit wider latitude for patients than the legislature had approved.45

Proposition 215 soon found some powerful, if controversial support in the form of
billionaires George Soros and Dan Lewis, each of whom contributed significantly to the
campaign for the initiative.46 Soros reportedly added his support because he believed that
government could not accomplish the goal by itself; notably, he was not in favor of legalizing
recreational use, just medical marijuana.47 However, detractors of the initiative would often
point to Soros’ contribution as one more way that the campaign was deceiving the voters,48 using
the money of wealthy, out-of-state elites.
The campaign focused on urban areas and emphasized the beneficial effects for cancer
and AIDS victims.49 Ultimately the initiative passed with 56 percent of the vote, a substantial
margin of victory.50 California’s initiative process then ensured that the text as written
immediately became law. The CUA’s key text is replicated here:

45
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(A) To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for
medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate and has been recommended by a physician
who has determined that the person's health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of
cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for
which marijuana provides relief.
(B) To ensure that patients and their primary caregivers who obtain and use marijuana for medical
purposes upon the recommendation of a physician are not subject to criminal prosecution or sanction.
(C) To encourage the federal and state governments to implement a plan to provide for the safe
and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical need of marijuana.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede legislation prohibiting persons from
engaging in conduct that endangers others, nor to condone the diversion of marijuana for nonmedical
purposes.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no physician in this state shall be punished, or
denied any right or privilege, for having recommended marijuana to a patient for medical purposes.
(d) Section 11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358, relating to the
cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or to a patient's primary caregiver, who possesses or
cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon the written or oral
recommendation or approval of a physician.
(e) For the purposes of this section, ‘primary caregiver’ means the individual designated by the
person exempted under this section who has consistently assumed responsibility for the housing, health, or
safety of that person.51

There are a number of notable places where the text of the law is vague, confusing or
fails to indicate how a measure should be brought about. Much of this wording was intentional
on the part of the authors. For example, subsection (B) purposefully doesn’t use the word
“prescription” but rather “recommendation,” in order to avoid conflicts with federal prescription
laws.52 These recommendations did not have to be submitted to a state entity; indeed there were
no “particular examination requirements” for screening.53 For those that did receive
recommendations, the law did not clarify how medical users could obtain marijuana (a state
distribution system is merely “suggested”), whether or not its transportation or sale was legal, or
what amount of possession was acceptable for a user. The CUA also relied heavily on the idea
of the “primary caregiver” as the person who could obtain and cultivate marijuana for a patient.
Scott Imler, one of the people who helped craft the act, spoke about the idea of the primary
caregiver:
51
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"When we used the term "primary caregiver" as best I can remember we had in mind a family
member or a close friend, perhaps a wife, husband, lover, in-law, son or daughter. Of course, we hoped
that eventually marijuana would be made available through ordinary drug stores, but we didn't expect that
to happen right away because of federal jurisdiction over the prescription system. So we figured that some
patients would grow it, some would have friends grow it, and there would be an interim distribution system
like the San Francisco Buyers club for some patients."54

Regardless of the intentions of the authors, the looseness of the term would become a
major point of contention as the courts increasingly focused on its meaning when deciding
medical marijuana cases. Were primary caregivers allowed to serve more than one client?
Could a distribution center count as a primary caregiver? Or perhaps the state itself?
Most notable is the fact that the law doesn’t set a definite list of diseases/symptoms that
are acceptable for treatment with medical marijuana, ending an exhaustive list of possible causes
with the open-ended indication for “any other illness for which marijuana provides relief.” This
stipulation is one of the key reasons the gray market emerged with such force in California,
while remaining relatively subdued in other states with more narrowly defined medical
marijuana statutes. In California, people would seek marijuana recommendations to treat
everything from chronic back pain, to insomnia, to depression.

The State Government Reacts
Proposition 215’s first big hurdle came in the form of a few key state personnel who were
rabidly against it. There were general complaints and doubts about the law from law
enforcement. Orange County Sheriff Brad Gates originally co-chaired the “No on 215”
committee,55 and continued to criticize the law, arguing that “the information didn’t allow the
voters to see all the facts.”56 Several local sheriffs and officers freely admitted that they had no
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idea what they’d do if the law passed, and many said they would keep enforcing the old
standards.57 Members of the LAPD told reporters that they would continue working directly
with the DEA, as federal law superseded any state developments.58
Perhaps the new law’s most important opponent was Dan Lungren, California’s attorney
general at the time. Lungren called the law “a disaster,” and stated that this was simply the first
step towards legalizing marijuana for recreational use. Once the initiative was actually in the
books, Lungren convened a committee to discuss implementation of the new law. One of their
first actions was to create a directive attempting to set up new guidelines for law enforcement
officers dealing with marijuana use. The language of the directive was highly restrictive and did
not actually require law enforcement officers to ask if users had a medical reason for taking the
substance.59 Lungren actually met personally with a number of law enforcement representatives
in December 1996, in a fruitless attempt to limit the causes medical users could claim and to
suggest additional statutes to control usage.60
The battle over implementation essentially stalled out the process for refining medical
marijuana policy in California. No one, not even the law’s supporters, could seem to agree on
where authority should have stemmed from: Should decisions have been made locally, on a
county-by-county basis, or should the state legislature have drafted further laws to assist in the
process of implementation?61 Was it simply a matter of those who were interested meeting their
goals without interference? Ultimately, development of the law and its stipulations didn’t really
occur until the term of Attorney General Bill Lockyer, Dan Lungren’s replacement. Until
Lockyer took over, the only clarification of the law that was requested by the state government
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was an attempt to change the wording of a statute prohibiting intrastate transportation of
marijuana to include the phrase “except for medical uses” – which was denied.62 During the
entirety of Lungren’s term, nearly no progress had been made in resolving the difficulties of
Proposition 215.
Lockyer’s term would prove to be a turning point in the intrastate conflict on medical
marijuana use. Where Dan Lungren had been opposed to the initiative from the start, Lockyer
was cautiously in favor of medical marijuana. The new attorney general assembled a task force
on medical marijuana in 1999 to attempt to work out various flaws in implementation.63 Lockyer
understood that further work on Proposition 215 would be difficult without the cooperation of
the federal government, and traveled to meet drug czar Barry McCaffrey in Washington.
McCaffrey demanded more research before medical marijuana could be considered effective
treatment. When Lockyer subsequently suggested that California could do some state-sponsored
research into the matter, McCaffrey threatened him with federal prison.64
Lockyer’s efforts to reform medical marijuana use within the state were subsequently
scaled back, and led to the creation of the Medical Marijuana Program Act.
National Reactions
In the immediate wake of Proposition 215’s success, Bill Clinton rushed to make a
formal announcement that federal laws were still in place.65 Clinton’s drug czar, Barry
McCaffrey, formally spoke out against the initiative in California, saying “This is not
medicine… this is a ‘Cheech and Chong’ show.”66 Substantial federal fines and penalties were
still present for all medical users, much less cultivators and distributors, who were at significant
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risk.67 Direct federal action against medical marijuana users and distributors in California would
soon become a more frequent occurrence once the DEA stepped up their activities within the
state. The White House ordered a fresh set of reports on medicinal or therapeutic uses for
marijuana from the Institute of Medicine; when the report concluded in 1999 that there were
potential medical uses “well-suited for certain conditions such as chemotherapy-induced nausea
and vomiting and AIDS wasting,” it was generally ignored.68 McCaffrey continued to champion
the use of Marinol in the illegal drug’s stead.69
Regardless, over the next few years numerous other states, including Washington, Alaska
and Oregon would pass their own (albeit more structured/restrictive) medical marijuana
statutes.70 Even as the number of states flagrantly contradicting federal drug law grew in
number, some members of the 105th Congress still aimed to stop the spread of medical
marijuana, with two bills known as the “Medical Marijuana Deterrence Act of 1997" (HR 1265)
and the "Medical Marijuana Prevention Act" (HR 1310), the first of which would have denied
certain federal benefits for criminal convictions in states that allowed medical marijuana, and the
second of which would give the U.S. attorney general greater power to suspend recommending
physicians’ licenses.71 A meeting of a House subcommittee on the matter even asked Barry
McCaffrey to campaign against further state initiatives; McCaffrey declined.72
Not all members of Congress were in opposition to the medical states’ actions. In 2002,
Representative Barney Frank of Massachusetts championed the lone bill that was pro-medical
marijuana, legislation that would reschedule marijuana to Schedule II, calling it the “Medical
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Marijuana in the States Act” (HR 1782).73 The bill never received so much as a preliminary
hearing in committee.74 Essentially, Congress forestalled any action either for or against medical
marijuana.
While the controversy over the laws continued, they were never formally overruled in
court, and as a result the conflict continued with a series of federal-state interactions designed to
suppress medical marijuana legislation’s effect without directly intervening against it on the
legislative or judicial front.
Federal Response I: Physician Licenses
The first manner in which the DEA attempted to stifle medical marijuana was to threaten
to revoke licenses for any physicians who prescribed or recommended medical marijuana.75
Compounded with the already dubious nature of prescribing a federally illegal drug, this
effectively chilled most certified medical authorities, preventing them from recommending the
substance even if they thought its use was indicated. Between control over physician licenses
and prescription law, the federal government essentially locked down any respectable, “white
market” means of accessing a supply of medical marijuana, cueing the creation of less official
ways to bypass the federal stranglehold.
Nearly immediately after the announcement, a group of California physicians and their
seriously ill patients filed suit against Barry McCaffrey, initiating a seven-year-long legal battle
that would come to be known as Conant v. Walters (2002). Both the American Medical
Association and California Medical Association asked the plaintiff, Dr. Conant, to drop the suit,
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worrying that it would only reflect poorly on the profession.76 The Conant case eventually came
to be about free speech above anything else. The Ninth Circuit eventually decided that the
government could not infringe on physicians’ free speech rights either by revoking their licenses
or conducting investigations of them based on any recommendation of marijuana,77 and filed an
injunction against any further attempts to do so. The decision notably excluded physicians who
“aid and abet the actual distribution and possession of marijuana.”78
The AMA subsequently released guidelines to advise physicians on how to deal with the
subject of medical marijuana, counseling against recommending it or assisting patients in
obtaining it, but allowing that doctors could discuss the risks and benefits of treatment with their
patients.79 The AMA’s reaction seems indicative of the medical profession in California as a
whole; the subject of medical marijuana was still considered fairly taboo even after Conant was
decided in the physician’s favor, and there was continuing worry that signing forms from
marijuana cooperatives would leave doctors open to federal enforcement actions.80 The potential
federal response effectively continued to chill legitimate medical recommendations from doctors,
despite being overturned in court.
Confusion and Court Cases
Slowly but surely, California’s current “system” of medical marijuana acquisition and
distribution began to fall into place. Rural areas such as Humboldt County emerged as prime
areas to grow the plant,81 while inner city distribution centers such as the Oakland Cannabis
Buyer’s Club rose to prominence as places to acquire the drug as well as partake of it. Urban
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areas eventually began to approve zoning for dispensaries and cannabis co-operatives, and the
gray market was gradually established. Theoretically this meant seriously ill patients would now
have greater, if not exactly legitimate, access to their medicine; it also opened the door for many
more people who claimed illness to obtain the substance.
Most of the early problems on a purely intrastate level originated from the logistics of
law enforcement. Early medical users had no form of identification; when police officers pulled
them over for transporting marijuana, they could claim a medical defense but had no proof. As a
result, officers tended to make arrests and then let the courts sort out the problems, further
clogging the courts with hundreds of marijuana possession cases.82 Individual officers were also
often stymied by the legislation. One report tells of an officer who assisted a medical patient in
moving his plants indoors after the patient provided proof of medical need, and subsequently
returned to arrest him the next day.83 Furthermore, sheriffs in some counties refused outright to
recognize the new laws: one deputy remarked after an arrest, “Proposition 215 does not apply in
Placer County.”84
Indeed, county-by-county implementation would prove to be another major issue. In the
absence of a generalized statewide plan for implementation, each county set a different level of
strictness for what constituted medical need, how much possession was allowed, and whether or
not dispensaries were prohibited. As a result the regulations for use of medical marijuana varied
wildly across the state; it was entirely possible to obtain a recommendation in one county and be
denied in another, or engage in behavior considered appropriate in Los Angeles that was
prohibited in Sacramento. In terms of medical marijuana, California was less a unanimous state
than a Balkanized set of zones.
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At this time several crucial early cases went before the California state courts. Notable
among them was People v. Peron, an action initiated against one of the people who crafted 215
and a proprietor of the San Francisco Cannabis Buyer’s Club for selling marijuana at said
establishment;85 People v. Trippet, a case that dealt with transporting marijuana and possession
in large quantities that was cleared;86 and People v. Young, a case that went directly against
Trippet by saying that the Compassionate Use Act did not provide an affirmative defense for
transportation of the drug.87 These court cases, especially the contradiction inherent in the
Trippet and Young decisions, show exactly how problematic the vagaries of the CUA proved to
be. By failing to establish the legality of sale, possession amounts, or transportation of
marijuana, the CUA left innumerable holes which AG Lungren could use to poke holes in the
already ramshackle infrastructure of intrastate medical marijuana. Without specific stipulations,
the California courts were left to sort out many of the smaller cases in any way they could.
The Medical Marijuana Program Act
The state legislature responded to the problem of distinguishing medical and recreational
users by crafting The Medical Marijuana Program Act in 2003. The program asked each county
to set up a system to register medical marijuana users and provide them with identification cards,
which could then be displayed by official users who were questioned by police officers. The act
also provided an affirmative defense for users who were apprehended while transporting
marijuana, a defense that was made retroactive in People v. Wright.88
The MMP had its own fair share of problems. Asking each county to develop their own
registration system further hybridized medical marijuana rules across the state: although the
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identification system was fairly uniform, county control over who received a card created
numerous different requirements to obtain one in any given area of California. Furthermore,
some counties resented the imposition and additional costs required by the MMP, leading to the
county of San Diego actually suing the state to be released from these obligations in an action
that eventually failed.89
The MMP helped solve the thorny issue of law enforcement’s ability to distinguish
between medical and non-medical users, but it did so at a price: the identification system merely
helped reinforce the gray market. Numerous dubious agencies sprang up advertising themselves
as easy providers of identification cards. Once the “patient” had an ID card, there was no further
check on their ability to obtain or possess marijuana. The MMP amounted to a quick patch for a
piece of legislation that was full of holes and served to solidify an already problematic system
instead of fixing it.
Federal Response II: Raids on Dispensaries and Individuals
After facing a judicial injunction in its attempts to block physicians from recommending
marijuana, and perhaps realizing that the market had found a way around that problem, the DEA
began to initiate raids on individual dispensaries, seizing their materials and assets and shutting
them down. These raids usually did not involve the arrests of the dispensary owners or patients,
just the seizure of assets and/or the shutdown of normal operations.90 Many of these operations
were targeted at finding those who cultivated the plants for the dispensaries:
“What is the information that the D.E.A. wants from the people they detain in these raids?” a man
asked.
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“They want to know who is in charge and where the medicine comes from,” Duncan answered.
“They want growers.” Patient records were untouched. “They left all the concentrates,” he added,
describing the aftermath of the raid on the Los Angeles Caregivers and Patients Group.91

In addition to physical raids, the Department of Justice would often seek to enjoin the
dispensaries from selling or distributing marijuana (as in the landmark case US. v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative).92 The dispensaries attempted to fight back using the courts as
well. These cases tended to hurt as opposed to help the co-ops’ cause, ultimately stripping a
number of presumptive defenses from both patients and staff facing federal law suits (these will
be explored in greater detail in Section 4 of this paper). They also failed to stop the DEA, not
even producing an injunction against the shutdowns. Instead, the DEA’s success in court only
emboldened them; in the immediate wake of the Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Club case, the
federal government raided the Los Angeles Marijuana Resource Center, a dispensary supplying
nearly 1000 patients, three-quarters of whom had AIDS.93
DEA raids on dispensaries became the primary federal tactic in the war on medical
marijuana in California; these were supplemented by numerous raids on the homes of
individuals, usually those who grew the substance in large quantities. In contrast to the
dispensary raids, these individuals were often arrested as well. Such was the case for the home
of Diane Monson, who together with Angel Raich grew marijuana to ease complicated medical
conditions; the DEA destroyed all six of the plants the duo were cultivating, leading to another
landmark case, Raich v. Gonzales.94
During George W. Bush’s administration alone almost 200 raids were conducted in
California.95 The fact that medical marijuana continued to exist and even thrive is indicative of
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the ultimate futility of this effort to expunge the drug from the state. Ultimately, the DEA’s
efforts were simply unsuccessful and financially wasteful.
Past the Ogden Memo
The 2009 memo from Deputy Attorney General David Ogden set up what essentially
amounts to détente between the medical marijuana states and the Department of Justice. Eric
Holder, the attorney general, promised that DEA raids on medical marijuana dispensaries would
end.96 In response, the ACLU dropped a major medical marijuana lawsuit that might have
created more permanent change in federal policy (Santa Cruz v. Holder, which will be discussed
in detail in the next section).97 A shaky peace between medical marijuana users and the Obama
Administration has been established.
Why, then, should medical marijuana in California still be considered an issue? The
conflict has ended (at least for the time being), but the intrinsic problems in the CUA and MMP
remain, and are actually increasing in the wake of the Obama administration’s decisions;
applications for medical marijuana retail outlets surged in the wake of Holder’s statement on the
DEA.98 The sheer volume of new establishments means they are more likely meant to profit off
individuals who are not in dire need of the drug, as opposed to a sincere desire to aid sick
patients. The gray market continues to exist in California, and now that the federal government
has ceased to oppose it, expansion is inevitable. Instead of merely giving up on the issue of
medical marijuana, the time has come for the federal government to guide its development,
ensuring a uniform standard while preventing the de facto legalization of recreational marijuana
use.
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As difficulties with both federal and local law enforcement mounted, California medical
marijuana users increasingly fought back by bringing their cases to the courts. Initial cases,
particularly those that only went as far as the California Court of Appeals, tended to rely upon a
combination of the CUA’s stipulations and the Fourteenth Amendment – either the Equal
Protection or Due Process clause, specifically the doctrine of medical necessity. As these
arguments were disqualified, and the focus increasingly shifted to blocking DEA interference,
the arguments increasingly appealing to the idea of federalism. In the wake of the Supreme
Court’s turn away from broad Congressional powers in U.S. v. Lopez and U.S. v. Morrison, the
issue of medical marijuana became firmly entangled with that of Congress’ Commerce Clause
powers. Despite the Court’s backpedaling in Raich v. Gonzales, the issue of whether the federal
government can properly intervene in California’s medical marijuana experiment still has
unresolved aspects, aspects that might have come to light in Santa Cruz v. Holder had the case
not been abandoned after the Ogden memo. This section explores the evolution of medical
marijuana defense and the corresponding judicial response.
Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process
Many medical marijuana users facing prosecution initially sought remedies under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A number of these centered around the
federal government’s own short-lived compassionate use program, with the obvious argument
that allowing some users to obtain medical marijuana while others were forbidden to use it was
unconstitutional as well as blatantly hypocritical. In Kuromiya v. United States, the plaintiffs did
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just that, presenting a claim of violation of equal protection because the government allowed
only a small number of users into the federal program.
Kuromiya, however, ran into the same problem most equal protection and substantive due
process cases do – the issue of fundamental rights. If the court believes that there’s a
fundamental right at stake, the issue is subject to strict scrutiny – the government must meet the
burden of proof that its actions were absolutely necessary. However, if there is no fundamental
right or liberty interest present, the courts will use rational basis review, where the government
merely needs to have a reasonable explanation for their actions. Kuromiya fell under rational
basis review, and the government had a rational basis to withhold marijuana supplies:
Specifically, the government decided to terminate the program altogether, citing among its reasons
"bad public policy, bad medicine, . . . the existence of alternative treatments" and a need to "balanc[e] the
government's desire to avoid distributing marijuana to increasing numbers of individuals with the interests
of those who had already relied upon the drug."' The court's opinion turned upon this last distinction
between those who have used marijuana medicinally with the government's blessing for many years, and
those that had not. Despite the "obviou[s] tension between the government's repeated statements that
marijuana has not been proven to provide any beneficial results and its decision to continue supplying it to
eight individuals for medical needs," the government could, the court ultimately held, treat these two
groups of people differently, as the government could treat a problem bit by bit, or treat only one aspect of
a problem at a time.99

The failure of the equal protection argument in Kuromiya (perhaps one of the only
successful arguments that could be made about unequal treatment with regard to medical
marijuana on the federal level) suggests that equal protection claims would not be a good defense
for medicinal marijuana users.
Substantive due process arguments, relating to the unenumerated rights protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, have been somewhat less high-profile. In part this
has been because fundamental liberty interests related to medicine have been becoming steadily
less successful in court:
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Outside the context of abortion… courts have hesitated to recognize fundamental rights related to
medical treatment. Particularly, courts have denied that patients possess a fundamental right to choose a
particular method of treatment for their illnesses...100

Key cases such as Washington v. Glucksberg (1997), where the Court decided there was
no such thing as a “right to die” in the matter of patient-assisted suicide, and United States v.
Rutherford (1979), where cancer patients were not allowed to use an experimental treatment
banned by the FDA, indicate a growing reluctance by the judicial branch to acknowledge patient
rights where they may conflict with other authority. There is a high probability that substantive
due process cases brought by medicinal marijuana users would be treated similarly.
The National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) did file an
amicus brief in U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers Cooperative ( a case discussed in greater detail
below) that suggested that medical marijuana use for cases that would otherwise prove
debilitating or fatal was part of a fundamental “right to life.” The Supreme Court explicitly did
not address the issue of substantive due process in their opinions, denying that they needed to
worry about constitutional avoidance (in other words, dealing with constitutional shortcomings
in the law such as Fifth Amendment violations) in the face of the failure of medical necessity:
Because we have no doubt that the Controlled Substances Act cannot bear a medical necessity
defense to distributions of marijuana, we do not find guidance in this avoidance principle. Nor do we
consider the underlying constitutional issues today. Because the Court of Appeals did not address these
claims, we decline to do so in the first instance.101

As a result, substantive due process may still be a significant argument for those patients
who are so debilitated that they cannot lead a manageable life without medicinal marijuana.
However, this defense has fallen out of usage in the wake of more decisive cases relating to
medical necessity and the Commerce Clause, each of which would provide broader defenses to
those who are not critically ill if they proved successful in court.
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Medical Necessity
The few faint stabs at using equal protection theory to support medical marijuana use
failed, thus leading defendants to try a new tactic using the doctrine of medical necessity – the
idea that they had to use medical marijuana in order to save their lives/guarantee their welfare,
which in turn justified breaking the law. Medical necessity was frequently used in state courts
for arguments in cases such as People v. Trippett (1997). When the Department of Justice sued
to shut down the Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Co-op, their primary defense was that the actions
they’d taken in distributing medical marijuana patients were also medically necessary.
Far from accepting this defense, the Supreme Court proceeded to tear it to pieces. Justice
Thomas’s majority opinion began by questioning the use of necessity doctrine in the first place:
We note that it is an open question whether federal courts ever have authority to recognize a
necessity defense not provided by statute. A necessity defense "traditionally covered the situation where
physical forces beyond the actor's control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils." (United
States v. Bailey(1980)). Even at common law, the defense of necessity was somewhat controversial… And
under our constitutional system, in which federal crimes are defined by statute rather than by common
law… it is especially so. As we have stated: "Whether, as a policy matter, an exemption should be created
is a question for legislative judgment, not judicial inference.”102

More importantly, when looking to the CSA, the Court decided that the wording of the
Schedule system specifically worked against any concept of medical necessity, noting that “a
medical necessity exception for marijuana is at odds with the terms of the Controlled Substances
Act. The statute, to be sure, does not explicitly abrogate the defense. But its provisions leave no
doubt that the defense is unavailable.”103
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According to Thomas, Schedule I of the CSA made a “determination of values”104
indicating that marijuana had no acceptable medical use, thus rendering any medical necessity
defense moot. Necessity defenses crumble in the face of statute, and, as the Court stated:
For marijuana (and other drugs that have been classified as "schedule I" controlled substances),
there is but one express exception, and it is available only for Government-approved research projects, §
823(f). Not conducting such a project, the Cooperative cannot, and indeed does not, claim this statutory
exemption.105	
  

While the decision was a unanimous 8-0 (Justice Breyer recused himself, as his brother
had delivered one of the majority opinions from the lower courts), Justice Stevens did write a
concurrence that left some opening for individuals who wished to claim medical necessity,
insisting that the Court’s holding was actually quite narrow: “Lest the Court's narrow holding be
lost in its broad dicta, let me restate it here: ‘[W]e hold that medical necessity is not a defense to
manufacturing and distributing marijuana. [emphasis in original]’”106 Stevens felt that casting
doubt on any necessity defense that does not have explicit statutory support was excessive, as
well as overbroad. His appeal to narrowness also recognized some key principles of federalism:
The overbroad language of the Court's opinion is especially unfortunate given the importance of
showing respect for the sovereign States that comprise our Federal Union. That respect imposes a duty on
federal courts, whenever possible, to avoid or minimize conflict between federal and state law, particularly
in situations in which the citizens of a State have chosen to "serve as a laboratory" in the trial of "novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."107

Regardless, the Court’s supposedly narrow holding had wide-reaching effects on the use
of medical necessity defenses, even on individuals. Two patients, “Todd McCormick and Peter
McWilliams, who suffered from bone cancer and AIDS respectively…”108 were brought into
district court on federal drug charges. The district court judge, George King, ruled that neither
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defendant could use a medical necessity defense – thus depriving them of any and all evidentiary
claims about their medical conditions, reasons for using the drug, or the existence of the
Compassionate Use Act.109
Even if, as Stevens indicated, the Court’s holding in US v. OCBC was intended to be a
narrow one, Thomas’ opinion effectively eviscerated the medical necessity defense for all
medical marijuana patients as well as distributors. If supporters of medical marijuana wanted to
defend themselves against federal charges, they would need a new argument.

The Commerce Clause – Background
The end of medical necessity forced medical marijuana proponents to consider other
strategies. As most of the resistance to usage was now coming from out of state, there was a
definite logic in choosing the doctrine of federalism – the notion that the federal government
should have limited powers, with the remaining governing force issuing from state and local
authority. As Justice Kennedy wrote in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton (1995):
The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would
have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.110

Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution enumerates Congress’s only powers, with all other
powers being delegated to the states as independent entities, as further guaranteed by the 10th
Amendment: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”111 Yet among these
enumerated powers (including both major international duties such as declaring war and more
minor national ones such as establishing post offices,) one eventually emerged as the de facto
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way for Congress to impose laws upon the states: the ability to regulate interstate commerce,
frequently called the Commerce Clause.112
The first expansion of the Commerce Clause came with Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), where
a majority opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall found that commerce was more than mere
exchange, but also everything involved in that process, including navigation, noting that
“Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse.”113 This
definition broadened the notion of the Commerce Clause beyond the strictest definition of mere
trade of goods to include all the surrounding processes that were necessary for doing so, but
ultimately retained the essential character of the limitations on Congress.
A far more major expansion would occur in the 20th century, beginning with the case
NLRB v. Jones & Laughin Steel Corp (1937). The case found the federal National Labor
Relations Board accusing the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation of unfair labor practices. 114
Here the Supreme Court made its first differentiation between “direct” and “indirect” effects on
commerce, and which effects Congress could control. Determining whether or not the references
to interstate commerce were at the heart of the law or “merely colorable,” the Court wrote:
…[The Act’s] terms do not impose collective bargaining upon all industry regardless of effects
upon interstate or foreign commerce. It purports to reach only what may be deemed to burden or obstruct
that commerce and, thus qualified, it must be construed as contemplating the exercise of control within
constitutional bounds. It is a familiar principle that acts which directly burden or obstruct interstate or
foreign commerce, or its free flow, are within the reach of the congressional power.
…Whether or not particular action does affect commerce in such a close and intimate fashion as to
be subject to federal control, and hence to lie within the authority conferred upon the Board, is left by the
statute to be determined as individual cases arise.115

The “close and intimate” relation between intrastate and interstate was actually found to
exist in the specifics of the steel factory in question, after respondents contested the direct
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relation of the NLRB’s provisions to interstate commerce, and the Court upheld the NLRB.
Much like Gibbons v. Ogden, the NLRB Court held that the Commerce Clause gave the
government the power to protect interstate commerce from all manner of “burdens and
obstructions,” even those that weren’t purely transactional. Even as it widened the scope of
Commerce’s power, NLRB noted the dangers of unlimited Congressional power, noting that:
This power must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be
extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in
view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what
is local and create a completely centralized government.116

Following closely from NLRB, Wickard v. Filburn (1942) cemented the Commerce
Clause’s nearly invulnerable position which it held for most of the 20th Century. Wickard came
after numerous Supreme Court cases that held New Deal legislation to be unconstitutional. In a
dramatic reversal, Wickard held a tremendously invasive financial policy to be legal because of
its tangential effect on interstate commerce.
Filburn was a small farmer who regularly set aside a portion of his own wheat to feed his
cattle. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 allotted him a certain quota of wheat
production that he was not allowed to exceed. When Filburn produced wheat over the quota,
despite the wheat being solely for farm consumption, the government still asked for a stiff
penalty fee for the excess crops. Filburn argued that since the crops were exclusively for his own
private use, they were not involved in interstate commerce, and Congress had no constitutional
authority to penalize him.
The Supreme Court made clear that they were no longer as interested in restricting
Congress, holding that while previous discussion centered around whether or not states’ actions
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were infringing upon the Commerce Clause by regulating economic action between each other,
the affirmative powers of the clause could also be explored:
For nearly a century, however, decisions of this Court under the Commerce Clause dealt rarely
with questions of what Congress might do in the exercise of its granted power under the Clause, and almost
entirely with the permissibility of state activity which it was claimed discriminated against or burdened
interstate commerce. During this period there was perhaps little occasion for the affirmative exercise of the
commerce power, and the influence of the Clause on American life and law was a negative one, resulting
almost wholly from its operation as a restraint upon the powers of the states. In discussion and decision the
point of reference, instead of being what was "necessary and proper" to the exercise by Congress of its
granted power, was often some concept of sovereignty thought to be implicit in the status of statehood…117

The Court held that Congress’ commerce powers could be extended not just to the actual
acts of commerce between the states, but also to anything that affected interstate commerce.118
The notion that intrastate activities could have a fundamental impact on interstate commerce
gave Congress a constitutional way to enact legislation on virtually any topic. This new
freedom is what lead to the variety of federal criminal statutes established over the course of the
20th century, including the CSA. The question of whether or not the law actually dealt with a
subject that had a substantial effect on commerce only became an issue when the Court finally
began to limit Commerce Clause powers in United States v. Lopez (1995).
Lopez dealt with a high-school student who carried a loaded handgun to school with him,
thus violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, “which forbids ‘any individual
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knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows . . . is a school zone…’”119 As a result,
Lopez was brought before a federal grand jury, who found him guilty of knowingly carrying a
handgun onto school grounds. When Lopez appealed, the Supreme Court opened a completely
new chapter on the Commerce Clause and the limits of federal criminal statutes.
Opening with a discussion of enumerated powers, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority
opinion went all the way back to Gibbons v. Ogden to argue for inherent limitations on the
Commerce Clause, including a quotation that’s notable for all purely intra-state matters:
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce, which is completely internal,
which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and
which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly
unnecessary.
Comprehensive as the word `among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which
concerns more States than one. . . . The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that
something, if we regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal
commerce of a State.120

In Lopez, Rehnquist drew a line in the sand on what could reasonably be considered
related to commerce in legislative action, noting that “[e]ven Wickard, which is perhaps the most
far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic
activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school zone does not.”121 In short, the Court
found no link between the Gun-Free Schools Act and economic activity:
Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort
of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms. 3 Section 922(q) is not an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless
the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding
regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in
the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.122
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Although Justice Breyer authored a dissent where he argued that the negative effects on
education that the law prevented could be tantamount to interstate commerce, Rehnquist rejected
this with a slippery slope argument:
…if Congress can, pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, regulate activities that adversely
affect the learning environment, then, a fortiori, it also can regulate the educational process directly.
Congress could determine that a school's curriculum has a "significant" effect on the extent of classroom
learning. As a result, Congress could mandate a federal curriculum for local elementary and secondary
schools because what is taught in local schools has a significant "effect on classroom learning," cf. post, at
9, and that, in turn, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.123

The opinion, much like NLRB, did not establish a formal test for what would count as
linked to interstate commerce, but nevertheless the Court thought “[these formulations] point[ed]
the way to a correct decision of this case.”124
Lopez was considered a milestone by those in favor of greater limits on federal power.
After all, the case marked only “the second time [the Court] had struck down a federal criminal
statute since 1936.”125 Yet not everyone thought that Lopez was the beginning of a new era of
judicial restriction on federal power; the specificity of the opinion combined with the lack of a
substantial test made many believe it was “just a hiccup in the great saga of American
constitutional law.”126 Lopez’s staying power would eventually be established five years later
with United States v. Morrison (2000).
Antonio Morrison was a member of the Virginia Tech football team, who admitted to
assaulting and raping a young woman at his college. The woman, Christy Brzonkala, dropped
out of school after Virginia Tech allowed Morrison to return from suspension, and proceeded to
sue Morrison under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA). VAWA, along with
providing funding for victims of gender-motivated violence, allowed civil rights suits against
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perpetrators. In a 5-4 decision, the majority, once again led by Rehnquist, overturned the civil
remedy portion of the law, holding it outside of Congress’ powers under both the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Rehnquist directly cited Lopez as the precedent for the decision that VAWA lacked a
fundamental relation to interstate commerce, despite the government’s claim of indirect effects
from a perceived lack of safety on the victim’s part. The majority opinion bluntly stated:
Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity. While
we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to
decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of
intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.127

The opinion once again backed this limiting of federal power in the context of a slippery
slope. Rehnquist worried that allowing VAWA as part of the Commerce Clause “…would allow
Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has
substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption.”128 Morrison effectively
doubled down on the notion that Congress could not regulate non-economic criminal activity –
that was a job the Constitution left to the states.
Both the Gun-Free School Zones Act and Violence Against Women Act were “by and
large supported by the states in which they operated,”129 with the lawsuits against them being
brought by individuals and not the states. The states did not protest the additional federal
legislation, which tended to duplicate existing state laws, yet the majority felt compelled to limit
the legislative branch back to its enumerated powers. The renewed emphasis on states’ rights
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and corresponding federal limitations led to a flood of Commerce Clause challenges to federal
laws;130 among them an attempt to end the federal stranglehold on medical marijuana.
	
  

Gonzales v. Raich
In the wake of the end of medical necessity, numerous scholars began to suggest that the
Commerce Clause could provide a remedy for state medicinal marijuana patients looking to end
the DEA’s interference in their actions. Alistair E. Newbern wrote a cautiously optimistic piece
in the California Law Review suggesting that “after Lopez and Morrison, the federal
government's authority to regulate intrastate use of marijuana for medicinal purposes is not the
foregone conclusion it once was.”131 Others were more dubious; Charles Doyle argued that the
Controlled Substances Act “including its proscriptions on the cultivation, distribution and
possession of marijuana, appears to be within the Congress’ Commerce Clause powers as
described in Lopez and Morrison.”132 There was only one way to determine whether the
Rehnquist Court’s newfound dedication to federalism would extend to medical marijuana: a case
would have to test the defense in court.
The first major Commerce Clause challenge to DEA authority came with Gonzales v.
Raich (2005), a case that was seen as the Court’s follow-up to Lopez and Morrison. The case
began with plaintiffs Angel Raich and Diane Monson, two Californian women who suffered
from serious medical ailments that they were treating with marijuana. Raich’s doctor attested
that her illness could well be fatal were it not for marijuana treatment.133 In 2002, both county
sheriffs and DEA agents closed in on Monson’s home. While the county officers decided the six
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cannabis plants Monson was growing were legal under California law, the federal officers seized
and destroyed them. Raich and Monson sued for a preliminary injunction under the Commerce
Clause, arguing “that the CSA's categorical prohibition of the manufacture and possession of
marijuana as applied to the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical
purposes pursuant to California law exceeded Congress' authority under the Commerce
Clause.”134 The federal government countersued, and the case went through the lower courts, a
process that generated wildly disparate opinions before finally making it to the Supreme Court.
Noting the lower courts’ reliance on Lopez and Morrison in those opinions that validated
a Commerce Clause challenge, Justice Stevens’ opinion (in a notable reversal of the federalism
he endorsed in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative) instead turned to
Wickard v. Filburn as the appropriate precedent for the case. Stevens called the similarities
between Wickard and Raich “striking”:
Like the farmer in Wickard, respondents are cultivating, for home consumption, a fungible
commodity for which there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market. Just as the Agricultural
Adjustment Act was designed "to control the volume [of wheat] moving in interstate and foreign commerce
in order to avoid surpluses ..." and consequently control the market price, a primary purpose of the CSA is
to control the supply and demand of controlled substances in both lawful and unlawful drug markets. 135

Although Wickard and Raich both involved the purely local cultivation/consumption of
goods that Congress intended to control on a national scale, the differences between the cases are
easily apparent from Stevens’ own statement. Because medical marijuana is a technically illegal
product, Congress’ interest in managing its prices outside of Monson’s home was much more
tenuously linked to interstate commerce than the supposed “aggregate behavior” that was a
central component of Wickard. While it is true that marijuana prohibition traditionally aims to

134
135

Ibid.
Ibid.

42

make “the drug expensive and difficult to obtain,”136 the purely local character of Monson and
Raich’s consumption should have erased any pretense of effect on national markets. The two
were using the drugs they grew themselves, not selling the products.
Stevens’ opinion justified the comparison by arguing that medical marijuana could be
“drawn into” the interstate market:
The parallel concern making it appropriate to include marijuana grown for home consumption in
the CSA is the likelihood that the high demand in the interstate market will draw such marijuana into that
market. While the diversion of homegrown wheat tended to frustrate the federal interest in stabilizing
prices by regulating the volume of commercial transactions in the interstate market, the diversion of
homegrown marijuana tends to frustrate the federal interest in eliminating commercial transactions in the
interstate market in their entirety.137

The majority opinion did take care to distinguish Raich from Lopez, arguing that the
Controlled Substances Act was more closely tied to economic activity, and that the scheduling
system itself was an “essential part[s] of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.”138 The Court
still refused to establish a test for what could and could not be considered economic, instead
using a 1966 Webster’s Dictionary to provide a definition, calling it “‘the production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities.’”139 This, of course, is an immensely broad
definition, as other scholars have noted:
Almost any human activity involves the “distribution” or “consumption” of a commodity,
if not its production. Having dinner at home surely involves the “consumption” of a commodity – food.
Similarly, giving a birthday present to a friend surely involves the “distribution” of a commodity. Any
such activity involving production, consumption or distribution can now be regulated by Congress so long
as its aggregate effect has a “substantial” impact on interstate commerce; and it is hard to deny that the
aggregate impact of eating and gift-giving on interstate commerce is indeed substantial.140
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Tossing aside Rehnquist’s fears of a slippery slope towards limitless federal power, the
majority opted for the broadest possible definition of what economic activity could mean, and
proceeded to back it up by resurrecting the idea of a “rational basis” as all that was needed for
Congress to relate their legislation to interstate commerce. The Court claimed that they “…need
not determine whether respondents' activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect
interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a "rational basis" exists for so concluding.”141 The
highly permissive nature of the rational basis test was a far cry from the strict nature of Lopez
and Morrison, each of which implied that findings of fact would be the crucial element when
Congress attempted to link legislation to economic activity. Use of a rational basis test did not
require such findings, only that Congress had a “rational basis” to make the decisions it did –
once again removing a potential control on federal power.
Even Justice Scalia seemed to think the majority’s broadening of the Commerce Clause
was unacceptable, filing a concurrence where he argued the government’s case could only be
made under the Necessary and Proper clause. Scalia repeatedly insisted that this would be a
more limited method of justifying congressional power with only the vaguest justification of
what would make it so:
Unlike the power to regulate activities that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, the power to enact laws enabling effective regulation of interstate commerce can only be
exercised in conjunction with congressional regulation of an interstate market, and it extends only to those
measures necessary to make the interstate regulation effective.142

Given the broader interpretation of a “market” that the majority endorsed, Scalia’s vision
of the Necessary and Proper Clause as an alternative to Commerce Clause powers seemed rather
irrelevant.

141
142

(Gonzales v. Raich)
Ibid.

44

The majority opinion featured other broad opinions beyond what could be regulated
under the Commerce Clause. While the Court of Appeals argued that there might be a sub-class
of users that were purely intrastate, medical and in accordance with state law, Stevens’ opinion
argued that there was no statutory exemption for that class, and Congress did not have to create
one – once again defending the legislation under the umbrella of “rational basis” theory. Indeed,
Justice Stevens heavily implied that such an exemption would prove problematic, as he believed
medicinal marijuana would flood into the normal market:
The exemption for cultivation by patients and caregivers can only increase the supply of marijuana
in the California market. The likelihood that all such production will promptly terminate when patients
recover or will precisely match the patients' medical needs during their convalescence seems remote;
whereas the danger that excesses will satisfy some of the admittedly enormous demand for recreational use
seems obvious.143

Given how loose the Compassionate Use Act’s terms are, perhaps this fear was justified,
but that still does not change the essential character of Stevens’ statement. The implication was
that state law was not sufficiently controlling medical marijuana, and that as a result, it was
leaking into the recreational market. The majority opinion basically accused the state
government of not doing its job well enough, while making a generalized and baseless
assumption about the medicinal marijuana movement as a whole.
Justices Thomas, O’Connor and Rehnquist all dissented, with O’Connor and Thomas
each writing separate dissents. O’Connor’s dissent was a stirring endorsement of stricter
limitations on Congress in the name of federalism, citing Justice Brandeis’ legendary opinion in
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann:
We enforce the "outer limits" of Congress' Commerce Clause authority not for their own
sake, but to protect historic spheres of state sovereignty from excessive federal encroachment and thereby
to maintain the distribution of power fundamental to our federalist system of government… One of
federalism's chief virtues, of course, is that it promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility that "a
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single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."144

O’Connor, despite acknowledging that she would not have personally voted for medical
marijuana, nonetheless insisted on California’s right to act as a laboratory in the manner
Brandeis suggested. She reacted furiously to the majority’s removal of limitations on federal
powers. Much of her dissent suggested that the Court was not following the same reasoning that
informed Lopez, but rather warping it to its own ends:
Seizing upon our language in Lopez that the statute prohibiting gun possession in school zones
was "not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could
be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated," the Court appears to reason that the placement of
local activity in a comprehensive scheme confirms that it is essential to that scheme..145

O’Connor went on to say that the decision rendered Lopez as “nothing more than a
drafting guide,” in that it meant Congress could have achieved fundamentally the same aims
constitutionally just by using different wording.146 By implying that the Raich decision utterly
defanged Lopez, she further called the Court to task for denying precedent.
While Justice O’Connor acknowledged the difficulties of analyzing Commerce Clause
cases in such a way that would produce a meaningful test – even admitting that the specifics of
each law could come into play in a way that would make uniform standards difficult to
accomplish – she still railed against the Court’s definition of what could be considered
economic, arguing that the definition the Court gave allowed a “federal police power”:
The Court's definition of economic activity is breathtaking. It defines as economic any activity
involving the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities. And it appears to reason that
when an interstate market for a commodity exists, regulating the intrastate manufacture or possession of
that commodity is constitutional either because that intrastate activity is itself economic, or because
regulating it is a rational part of regulating its market. 147
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O’Connor disagreed with the majority opinion across the board, also believing that it was
possible to create a dual-class distinction between medical and non-medical users. Justice
Thomas, writing a separate dissent as well as joining O’Connor’s opinion, was somewhat more
moderate, mostly arguing against Scalia’s interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause and
suggesting tighter adherence to enumerated powers. He also defended California’s ability to
administrate itself against Justice Stevens’ suggestion that medicinal marijuana would leak into
recreational markets:
We normally presume that States enforce their own laws, and there is reason to depart from that
presumption here: Nothing suggests that California's controls are ineffective…
But even assuming that States' controls allow some seepage of medical marijuana into the illicit
drug market, there is a multibillion-dollar interstate market for marijuana. It is difficult to see how this vast
market could be affected by diverted medical cannabis, let alone in a way that makes regulating intrastate
medical marijuana obviously essential to controlling the interstate drug market.148

Of course, Justice Thomas’ and O’Connor’s dissents were just that – dissenting opinions
that did not change the outcome. Growing medical marijuana was still illegal under the CSA,
and now even the exceptions suggested in Justice Stevens’ dissent in US v. Oakland Cannabis
Buyers’ Cooperative seemed exhausted. While the Court stopped short of eviscerating the
substantive due process defense that it left similarly untouched in prior cases, if individual
conduct could count as economic activity in the aggregate, then Congress (and by extension the
DEA) had Commerce Clause authority to enact the CSA against anyone who possessed medical
marijuana in the state of California.

Santa Cruz v. Holder
As Gonzales v. Raich went into appeal, another pitched battle was being fought in the
courts, this one over the shutdown of a dispensary. In 2002, the DEA raided the Wo/Men’s
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Alliance for Medical Marijuana (WAMM), seizing plants and harvested marijuana as well as
detaining several of its patients.149 In response, WAMM, in conjunction with the highly
supportive city of Santa Cruz, sued for a preliminary injunction against the government’s
behavior in much the same manner that Raich and Monson did for Gonzales v. Raich. Filing an
extensive complaint listing the suing patients’ numerous maladies, WAMM and Santa Cruz
presented a list of possible actions, among them substantive due process and Commerce Clause
claims.150 Yet they also went to the unprecedented step of claiming a cause of action under the
Tenth Amendment:
DEA seizure of medical marijuana violates the Tenth Amendment by preventing the State
of California from implementing a duly enacted statute, the Compassionate Use Act of 1996. Such seizures
commandeer the police power of the State of California and its political subdivisions, including the County
of Santa Cruz, over the health and safety of California citizens.151

The accusation of commandeering was a fresh attack on the “federal police power” that
Justice O’Connor feared. While few laws had been invalidated under the commandeering
principle until the 1990s, the case of New York v. United States (1992) initiated a brief wave of
cases where statutes were overturned for forcing states to enact federal regulations.152 Whether
cases such as New York v. US and its follow-up, Printz v. United States (1997) are actually
applicable to cases where the DEA enforced regulations is questionable; both of those cases dealt
primarily with situations where the federal government compelled the state to enforce a law, as
opposed to intervening directly, as the DEA did in California. The DEA certainly superseded
California’s police power, but federal agents carried out the actions, not county officials, so the
charge of commandeering would appear to be less than founded.
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The federal government moved to dismiss the suit, and Judge Jeremy Fogel of the
District Court relented, citing Glucksberg, the then-pending Raich and the difficulty of a
Commerce Clause challenge as reasons that the case could fail on the merits of the actions.153
WAMM appealed to the Ninth Circuit, who eventually asked Fogel to reconsider the case in light
of Raich, prompting the plaintiffs to create a second complaint arguing that the federal
government’s strategies had the ultimate effect “rendering California’s medical
marijuana laws impossible to implement and thereby forcing California and its political
subdivisions to recriminalize medical marijuana.”154 This time, when the government once again
moved to dismiss, Fogel changed his opinion and argued that, if in fact there was deliberate
subversion, then the plaintiffs’ claims could be cognizable:
If Plaintiffs can prove that Defendants are enforcing the CSA in the manner alleged, a
question as to which the Court expresses no opinion, they may be able to show that Defendants deliberately
are seeking to frustrate the state’s ability to determine whether an individual’s use of marijuana is
permissible under California law. A working system of recommendations, identification cards and
medicinal providers is essential to the administration of California’s medical marijuana law. The effect of a
concerted effort to disrupt that system at least arguably would be to require state officials to enforce the
terms of the CSA.155

From there, the case would ostensibly have proceeded to a full case where the
merits would be discussed. However, just a few months later, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder
made the public announcement of a shift in DOJ policy, followed by the Ogden memo. In
response, the plaintiffs dropped the lawsuit, dismissing it without prejudice, although
guaranteeing that they could reinstate the case if the DEA no longer held to Ogden’s terms:
The parties further stipulate and agree that if Defendants withdraw, modify or cease to follow the
Medical Marijuana Guidance, this case may be reinstituted in its present posture on any Plaintiffs’ motion,
although if any Plaintiff seeks to reinstitute this case, Defendants reserve the right to argue that they have
not withdrawn, modified or ceased to follow the Medical Marijuana Guidance, and that this case is moot.156
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The reactivation clause essentially means that as long as the DEA leaves the cooperatives
alone, the case will continue to exist in legal limbo, waiting for the potential change in federal
policy that would make it necessary. The détente between the Obama Administration DOJ and
the medical marijuana community was official.
What Remains Unresolved?
As the dust settled on the numerous cases the courts processed relating to the
Compassionate Use Act, a number of prospective defenses for patients, caregivers and
cultivators stood eviscerated. Equal protection, medical necessity and Commerce Clause
arguments had all been heard and deemed inadequate by the Supreme Court. By the time of the
Ogden Memo, however, there were still a few possible actions left untouched, that could be
resurrected should the DEA ever return to its offensive against the CUA.
Substantive due process arguments were repeatedly put forth but never considered by the
courts. Their success seems unlikely with the Court’s history in Rutherford and Glucksberg, but
there is nonetheless a possibility that the defense could be revived for seriously ill patients whose
health will decline extraordinarily without medical marijuana. Santa Cruz included a substantive
due process claim that wasn’t seriously considered, but it’s always possible that another case
could bring it to the fore.
The Tenth Amendment commandeering charge that Santa Cruz put forth was also never
put to the test in court. Given how the courts have treated more plausible arguments such as
those relating to the Commerce Clause, it seems a bit of a stretch to believe that they would
seriously consider the federal government’s actions to be beyond a rational basis. Regardless,
were the DEA to reinstate raids, Santa Cruz would be reinstituted as well, and the case could
conceivably reach the Supreme Court. Given the roughly ten year gap that would likely transpire
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between Raich and whenever Santa Cruz finished the appeals process, the Supreme Court could
have a different set of justices with different opinions; many of the justices who decided Raich
(among them both Stevens and O’Connor) have already retired. In other words, whether or not
the positive defenses remaining to medical marijuana users are effective is still an unknown, and
cannot really be predicted unless the cases against the government are reactivated.

5.	
  What	
  Can	
  the	
  Federal	
  Government	
  Do?	
  
The Ogden memo left the situation in California largely unresolved – by simply
abandoning their previous strategies against medical marijuana, the federal government
essentially left the issue entirely up in the air, creating no useful precedents or even truly any
decision-making beyond a simple truce with the medical marijuana users. From here, future
administrations could make any number of decisions to change the federal government’s stance
towards medical marijuana – and some would be more productive than others.
Option One: Continued Détente
The easiest option to pursue is the one that’s already in place. The federal government
could continue to abide by the terms of the Ogden memo, and dedicate DOJ and DEA resources
to other pursuits instead of hounding medical marijuana dispensaries and users. There are
definite upsides to this policy: conserving the government’s limited resources for targets that
might actually have a legitimate effect on the war on drugs is certainly one of these, and the
détente forgoes further lawsuits and court cases a la Santa Cruz. Those who truly need medical
marijuana are left unmolested.
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Yet the uneasy truce set up between the executive and California has many drawbacks.
For one, each new administration still has the option to undo the Ogden memo and resume the
raids and lawsuits against medical marijuana in California, leading to a troubling lack of
permanence for the détente. Much worse, however, is that the truce doesn’t do anything about
the flaws in California’s legislation.
By simply leaving the issue alone, the federal government hasn’t stopped the prevailing
tendencies towards the gray market. Applications for retail outlets selling marijuana “surged” in
the wake of Holder’s announcement.157 Centers offering easy access to “pot cards” are bound to
proliferate even further. Despite the announcement, doctors have not radically changed their
stance towards prescribing medical marijuana. So the situation is still fundamentally the same as
it was in the early 2000s: recreational users who just want an identification card from a
potentially illegitimate source are still more likely to obtain one than legitimate patients who talk
to their general practitioner.
There are still little to no limits on who can be considered an eligible patient. There are
still fundamental differences from county to county as to enforcement of the rules as well as
identification card systems. The truce that the Ogden memo provides might be good for current
users and for a beleaguered justice system, but it does nothing to solve the fundamental problems
of the CUA. Medical marijuana laws in California are still a crazy quilt of vague language,
patchwork legislation and haphazard court decisions. And the fundamental tension between state
law and federal law will still exist for patients who wish to travel outside the state, let alone
between counties. So far, détente hasn’t caused further harm, but it hasn’t solved any problems.
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Option Two: Returning to Raids
A return to DEA crackdowns and subversion of California law is still possible at any
time. While it’s doubtful that the DEA would be able to accelerate beyond the usual dispensary
shutdowns and federal criminal arrests that characterized earlier attempts to control medical
marijuana, such efforts still further complicate attempts to safely provide actual patients with the
medicine they need. Patients who actually do need medical marijuana – those suffering from
AIDS, cancer, or glaucoma for example – would still likely find themselves facing harassment.
This technique also leads to further law enforcement expenses, hundreds of court-clogging cases,
and the redirection of resources away from the more crucial targets that Holder and Ogden have
suggested.
Finally, if the federal government were to begin a fresh effort to work against Proposition
215, they would likely have to deal with the pending preliminary injunction given to Santa Cruz
v. Holder, then wait while the case works its way through the court system before beginning a
new round of enforcement. All of these problems would reemerge with the renewed
implementation of a system that never did very much to control medical marijuana in the first
place. DEA crackdowns only led to the creation and eventual thriving of the gray market; a
resurgence of those tactics will not make it go away.
Legalizing Medical Marijuana
Perhaps the least likely path for the future of medical marijuana, and also the one with the
greatest potential to change the current situation, is the federal government somehow allowing
medical marijuana in the states. In the process of doing so, one would hope that marijuana
would be rescheduled, firmer guidelines would be set in place for which patients could use the
drug, and doctors would finally feel free to prescribe the drug in a more official distribution
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system. If legal guidelines like these were set in place and offered as substantial carrots for
states to work with the federal government instead of against it, a legitimate “white market”
could replace the current gray market infrastructure in California.
There are numerous hurdles that would prevent such a system from coming about, not the
least of which is reluctance from all three branches of the federal government to do anything
about the problem. Numerous bills have come before Congress suggesting a rescheduling of
marijuana in the CSA, or some method of allowing states to initiate medical marijuana programs
without contravening federal law. Just as many bills have been proposed that would try to
penalize those states that had already enacted medical marijuana in an attempt to dissuade other
states from creating similar legislation. All of these have failed to leave committee, much less
make it onto the floor for a vote.
The legislative branch refuses to touch the issue, and there are a number of possible
reasons why. Medical marijuana is a politically sensitive issue – it deals with a cause that is
traditionally only the province of the highly liberal or libertarian (marijuana legalization) but it
does so in a way that foregrounds the suffering of people with legitimate medical concerns.
Even in the best possible political climate, only a very small portion of politicians will want to
associate themselves with marijuana legalization – those on the far left, perhaps identified with
the progressive movement, or those libertarians who truly believe in small government (a
surprisingly rare breed). Yet while no congressman wants to be the one to legalize pot, they
certainly do not want to be seen as denying medicine to those who are gravely ill. Essentially,
politicians looking to avoid controversy on the medical marijuana issue are damned if they do,
damned if they don’t – and as a result, they simply submerge any attempt to deal with the matter
in one way or another.
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The executive branch has even less incentive to change their stance on medical
marijuana. The DEA actually stands to gain so long as marijuana is considered illegal, as this
inflates the number of drug users in the United States, creating statistics that are effective in
arguing for a larger budget. While medical marijuana users make up just a small fraction of the
number of total illegal users, many consider it one more step towards making marijuana use
legitimate. Internal efforts at rescheduling the drug have already failed, and it is clear that the
DEA’s policy only changed when the Attorney General and Department of Justice completely
changed their stance. Change seems to come from the top down.
Yet most presidents are unable to afford looking “soft on drugs,” especially those that
have tried drugs themselves. This problem preemptively ended any attempt Clinton might have
made to alter the DEA’s stance on marijuana, despite his personal opinions on the issue.
Obama’s move towards détente is probably the most any president would dare to risk on the
subject; the change attracted surprisingly little press in the midst of far more pressing national
issues. The administration also waged a small campaign against Proposition 19, thus solidifying
its stance as pro-medical marijuana but anti-legalization.158 Had the Obama Administration done
more towards actually legalizing medical marijuana, their actions might have aroused more
controversy.

While most presidents have asked for research to determine whether or not

marijuana can be a legitimate therapeutic tool, this research is frequently ignored – again,
probably because of political concerns. As more and more people try marijuana in their youth –
and admit to experimenting with it if they embark upon a political career – it actually becomes
less likely that they will push for progressive medical marijuana regulation, due to the
contradictory demands of having to look tough on drugs because of their past.

158
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So, if legalization were considered a legitimate possibility for medical marijuana, where
would the impetus for change develop? With the normal routes for political change effectively
frozen, the first spark would likely be a court case along the lines of Santa Cruz – admittedly
itself a situation that will not arise unless the DEA resumes interference in California’s practices.
However, should the case come to the Supreme Court, this would be a rare opportunity to revisit
an issue under a different legal pretense – the Commerce Clause wasn’t considered a focal point
of Santa Cruz’s action. To countermand the drastic shift away from federalism that was
displayed in Raich, the Court could strengthen the Tenth Amendment in an effort to restore
states’ rights. Such a decision would strengthen the “laboratory” and “vote with your feet”
principles inherent in federalist thinking. The ideal outcome would end by allowing all states
with medical marijuana statutes to continue their policies.
The Role of Other States
There is one other way that medical marijuana could be brought to the foreground of
national consciousness, potentially forcing the federal government to take action on the issue.
Numerous other states have legalized affirmative defenses for medical marijuana that are much
more restrictive than California’s, among them Washington, Alaska, and Colorado.159 Should
one of these states move towards a broader law that’s also better structured than California’s, it
could bring attention to the evolution of medical marijuana in the states.
The ACLU of Washington is currently looking to pass such a law, and the State Senate
has already approved the new bill, which would offer greater protection to dispensaries as well as
patients.160 ACLU-WA has also been working on proposals to distribute marijuana through the

159
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state’s liquor stores161 – a highly controlled method of legalization that would doubtlessly bring
attention to marijuana in the states. Such a system would be more immune to complaints of
“leaking” into other markets, as Justice Stevens feared in Raich. Should the new laws garner
national attention, more states might try similar systems, and eventually the public response
could force Congress to finally acknowledge medical marijuana statutes in one way or another –
and likely create further regulations as to the drug’s distribution and use that would change
California’s system for the better.
Federal Medical Marijuana Statutes?
If a new development such as a court case or other state development occurs, the other
branches could choose to react in one of three ways: returning to subversion (note that an
unfavorable outcome in court could rule this out), maintaining détente, or rescheduling marijuana
on the CSA and creating a new framework for the states. Of the three, the most effective choice
would be creating a new system that states could choose to adopt. Given the legislature’s current
attitude towards medical marijuana, a federal statute would have much less permissive language
than the CUA, and would likely make greater efforts to control who is given access to medical
marijuana. The legislature could then coerce states into implementing its vision of medical
marijuana through the usual carrots and sticks applied to federal laws – distribution of funding,
eligibility for certain federal programs, etc. Federal backing of medical marijuana in limited
circumstances would enable doctors to prescribe cannabis more freely for cases that truly
demanded it. Before long, the new rules would allow a white market to overtake and subsume
the gray market that the CUA and MMP allowed.

161

Interview with Alison Holcomb conducted Spring 2011.
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Of course, the vision of a federally-sanctioned white market outlined above has numerous
hurdles towards its becoming a reality, beyond even the requisite court cases and appropriate
legislative response. Should marijuana become an official drug approved for medical usage, the
FDA would have to set standards for uniform quality and dosage of the substance – something
that’s notoriously difficult with cannabis, which produces different reactions in many users.162
The difficulties of standardization could lead to complications.
Another would be the perennial questions of the legality of growing, possessing, and
transporting medical marijuana, and in what quantities. Any framework that would provide an
impetus for change would likely be substantially different from California’s current system, and
as a result local and state law enforcement would once again have to go through a period of
adjustment – not to mention the current medical marijuana users, who would have to change
their current system to adopt that of the federal government. Such a situation could potentially
lead to further state-federal conflict.
In sum, even the net positive changes that could occur should the federal government
begin working with the states in regulating medical marijuana instead of against them would be
fraught with challenges. Because of the way the situation in California has evolved, with a
patchwork of local laws and highly idiosyncratic county enforcement, a uniform standard of the
variety that the CUA should have attempted from the beginning will now be difficult to
accomplish. Of course, the potential benefits that would come from ending the state-federal
conflict and getting rid of the gray market are many, and would likely benefit all those whose
suffering could truly be cured by medical marijuana but are currently incapable of obtaining it
through the white market, while minimizing the amount of “leakage” to recreational users. The
difficulties could be numerous, but that shouldn’t prevent an attempt at trying to resolve them.
162
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There are very few systems that would be worse at accomplishing the voters’ intent than the one
that’s currently in place.

6.	
  Conclusion	
  
The Compassionate Use Act began life as faulty legislation: overbroad, under-defined
and with no clear strategy for implementation. As a result, the CUA was initially ignored by
local law enforcement and the executive branch of the state government. As the counties and
courts were left to fill in the gaps, a patchwork quilt of differing rules and regulations developed.
These growing pains were only exacerbated by the federal response, which aimed to shut down
medical marijuana use in the area through chilling physicians’ speech and raiding dispensaries
and patients.
Instead of preventing the state from enabling medical marijuana, the federal response
merely pushed it out of the hands of more qualified doctors and physicians, helping to create the
gray market – a makeshift system of “recommendations” and DIY dispensaries that operate
outside the traditional medical establishment, and as a result often sell to those who have less
serious needs. The system is anything but controlled. As even transportation quantities and the
legality of selling the substance had to be worked out through the California courts, there’s been
even fewer opportunities to create uniform doses for patients, ensure the quality of materials or
even really tightly regulate how one comes to be identified as a medical marijuana user.
Medical marijuana laws became linked to federalism in the Courts through cases like
Raich v. Gonzales and Santa Cruz v. Holder. But while those cases have important implications
for Congress’ Commerce Clause powers and the commandeering principle in the 21st century,
medical marijuana in the states really comes down to the principles of federalism as a whole.
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Madison’s Federalist papers outlined a system where local government would by and large
retain most of its powers, and Congress would generally leave these alone in favor of tending to
national affairs. Such a system has distinct advantages: the ability for some states to act as
“laboratories” for legislation in others, the notion that citizens can “vote with their feet” by
moving to states that have the policies they prefer, and the encouragement of direct democracy
through citizens organizing initiatives. By pioneering medical marijuana initiatives, California
attempted to act as a laboratory, and the federal government worked tirelessly to interfere in any
way it could.
This intervention represents another step toward a federal police power at a time when
our country needs federalism more than ever. The United States has not been more politically
polarized since at least the 1960s. The emergence of radical groups such as the Tea Party within
the greater party structure as well as the difficulties the 2008 Congress faced in passing
legislation should confirm that the United States is currently experiencing extreme internal
divisions. A stronger federal government will only exacerbate these problems. When citizens
are possessed of such highly differing opinions, the ability to move to states that support the
legislation citizens want – be it medical marijuana support, more gun rights, or legal gay
marriage – will go some way towards alleviating those political tensions without forcing the
entire nation to make a decision one way or the other. The United States were meant to reflect
their name: a collection of smaller jurisdictions with differing policies that could also operate as
a nation, as opposed to one massive unified state with uniform laws.
The Ogden memo implicitly went back to some of the principles of federalism by reining
in the Department of Justice’s activities within the states. Yet the damage had been done: the
CUA and MMP’s growth was thoroughly stunted by the DEA’s continued raids and harassment.
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What is now necessary – what may, indeed, have been necessary from the start – is outside
guidance in reforming California’s medical marijuana laws to thoroughly establish marijuana as
controlled medicine and not a de facto legal substance. Such guidance could come from another
state creating a more efficient and controlled cultivation/distribution system that gains national
support, or from a drastic sea change in government policy that leads to a renewed focus on
medical marijuana in the courts.
Either way, the time has come for the federal government to stop creating problems for
state medical marijuana programs and start helping them evolve towards a system that can
effectively control the substance. Medical marijuana should be easy to obtain for those who
truly need it, and kept out of the hands of those who don’t. California’s system has consistently
failed to do this, and simply ending the federal war on medical marijuana statutes doesn’t repair
the faulty mechanisms in place.
What’s necessary now isn’t just the federalism of non-intervention. The federal
government must now offer positive support to the states that have undertaken medical
marijuana statutes. Such a law could still support the values of federalism. By leaving states the
option of whether or not to create medical marijuana statutes Congress could continue to support
choice within the different states. At the same time, rescheduling medical marijuana and
providing guidelines for its distribution and use would help states that have approved medical
marijuana ensure that they have a more solid legal basis for their programs, and help them
control the substance’s spread to create a white market for those in need.
Denying the existence of state medical marijuana statutes has proven ineffective. But if
the federal government chooses to embrace them, there’s still a chance to make medical
marijuana work in the manner that the voters intended. Non-intervention will not solve the mess
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that federal-state interaction in California created, but positive interaction between the state and
the federal government has a definite chance of fixing the state’s problems.
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